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Review Essay
A Paradigm Shift in IntelLectual Property Discourse:
Fresh Perspectives on OLd Debates
COMMON AS AIR: REVOLUTION, ART, AND OWNERSHIP, by Lewis Hyde'
IN PRAISE OF COPYING, by Marcus Boon2
TERESA SCASSA3
ON 29 SEPTEMBER 2011, Canada's Conservative government introduced Bill
C- 11,4 a dusted-off copyright reform bill, which had its last incarnation as Bill
C-32.' Bill C-32 had been the latest instalment of a series of ill-fated copyright
reform bills that died on the order paper in Parliament. Bills C-i1 and C-32 are
different from their predecessors' in some significant respects. Perhaps most nota-
bly, these bills bear certain hallmarks of citizen engagement in copyright debates.
Due to the efforts of activists who organized Internet and Facebook campaigns
on copyright reform, the government was pressured to consider the views of
ordinary Canadians alongside those of the usual cast of industry lobbyists.7
1. (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2010) [Hyde, Common asAir].
2. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010).
3. Canada Research Chair in Information Law and Professor, University of Ottawa, Faculty
of Law, Common Law Section. 1 gratefully acknowledge the helpful comments of Charles
Sanders on an earlier draft of this essay.
4. Copyright Modernization Act, 1 st Sess, 41st Parl, 2011, online: <http://www.parl.gc.ca/
HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Language=E&Mode= 1 &Docld=5144516>.
5. Bill C-32, An Act to Amend the CopyrightAct, 3rd Sess, 40th Parl, 2010, online: <http://
www2.parl.gc.ca/Sites/LOP/LEGISINFO/index.asp?Language=E&query=7026&Session=23
&List=toc> [Bill C-32].
6. Predecessors of Bill C-32 that have also died on the order paper include Bill C-60, An Act to
Amend the Copyright Act, 1st Sess, 38th Parl, 2004-2005; and Bill C-61, An Act to Amend the
CopyrightAct, 2nd Sess, 39th Parl, 2007-2008.
7. See "Fair Copyright for Canada," online: <http://www.facebook.com/group.
php?gid=6315846683>; Michael Geist, "Online Rights Canada Launches National
334 12011149 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
Predictably, this citizen input has not transformed Bill C-Il into a manifesto
to meet the needs and desires of ordinary users of works. The gains for users
are modest, but that they exist at all in a political climate that so favours large
corporate interests is indeed remarkable.' Not surprisingly, those same corporate
interests have been vehemently contesting the ground gained for users in the
Bill, 9 and it remains to be seen how these exceptions will fare in committee.
Nevertheless, this moment in Canadian copyright history is worth acknowl-
edging, and it is one that nicely frames two recent contributions to the broader
literature on intellectual property law. Common as Air: Revolution, Art, and Own-
ership"0 by Lewis Hyde characterizes discourse about intellectual property law
as discourse about citizenship and democracy, while In Praise of Copying" by
Marcus Boon explores the social and cultural significance of copying. Both
books speak to a reawakening of the link between how we live our lives-how
we interact with our culture, with each other, and with our democratic institu-
tions-and what this means, or should mean, for intellectual law and policy.
A great deal of ink has been spilled in the last two decades on the subject of
intellectual property law generally and on copyright law in particular. This is not
surprising given that they have become such a source of debate since the advent
of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 2
Consultations on Copyright Modernization," online: <http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/
view/1238/99999/>. In response to the citizen activism, the government launched a far more
inclusive consultation process. See Industry Canada, News Release, "Governmcnt of Canada
Launches National Consultations on Copyright Modernization" (20 July 2009) online:
<http://www.ic.gc.caleic/site/icl .nsf/eng/04840.html>.
8. Some of these gains included changes to the fair dealing exception. These changes would
permit fair dealing for the purposes of education, parody, and satire, as well as the inclusion
of exceptions for non-commercial user-generated content, for reproduction for private
purposes, and for home recording of broadcast content for time-shifting purposes. See
Bill C-32, supra note 5, cls 29, 29.21, 29.22, 29.23. Of course, the gains are also counter-
balanced by new provisions outlawing tampering with digital locks, even for purposes that
would otherwise fall within the "users' rights" provisions of the Copyright Act. See Copyright
ActRSC, 1985, c C-42.
9. See e.g. the Joint Statement of ninety members of the copyright industry on Bill C-32:
Canadian Cultural Industries' Joint Statement on C-32, "Bill C-32 Weakens Canada's
Global Competitiveness: New Exceptions to Copyright Would Undermine Canada's Digital
Economy" (1 February 2011), online: <http://ccarts.ca/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/
CopyrightStatementENGJAN31 .pdf>.
10. Supra note 1.
11. Supra note 2.
12. Being Annex 1C to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 15
April 1994, 1867 UNTS 3 (entered into force 1 January 1995), online: <http://treaties.
un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201867/vi 867.pdf>.
REVIEW ESSAY 335
in 1994. In a relatively short span of time, we have seen corporations move to
lock up digital content alongside international developments aimed at providing
legal protection for anti-circumvention measures used in digital works.1 3 Terms of
protection have grown longer,14 exceptions are under challenge," and individual
users have become the target of large-scale enforcement activity that previously
had only been aimed at organized or corporate malefactors.16 Legislators devote
increasing amounts of time and attention to intellectual property,7 and it is a recur-
ring topic in international treaty negotiations." It is not surprising, therefore, that
13. The WIPO Copyright Treaty, for example, requires signatories to make separate provision in
copyright. law to protect the technical protection measures used to lock up digital content.
WIPO Copyright Treaty, 20 December 1996, 2186 UNTS 121, (entered into force 6 March
2002), arts 5, 11, online: <http:I//reaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTSVolume%202186/
v2186.pdf>.
14. In both the United States and the European Union the term of copyright protection has
expanded from life of the author plus fifty years to life of the author plus seventy years. See
EC, Directive 2006/116/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December
2006 on the term ofprotection ofcopyright and certain related right, [2006] OJ, L372/27 at
12-18; Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub L No 105-298, § 505, 11 Stat 2827 (1998).
15. For example, many have argued that amendments to prohibit interference with technical
protection measures will limit the ability of users of works to exercise their fair dealing rights.
See Ian R Kerr, Alana Maurushat & Christian S Tacit, "Technical Protection Measures:
Tilting at Copyright's Windmill" (2002-2003) 34 Ottawa L Rev 9 at 47-48; Michael Geist,
"Anti-circumvention Legislation and Competition Policy: Defining a Canadian Way?" in
Michael Geist, ed, In the Public Interest: The Future of Canadian Copyright Law (Toronto:
Irwin Law, 2005) 211 at 235 [Geist, Public Interest]; Carys Craig, "Locking out Lawful
Users: Fair Dealing and Anti-Circumvention in Bill C-32" in Michael Geist, ed, From
"Radical Extremism" to "Balanced Copyright"- Canadian Copyright and the DigitalAgenda
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2010) 177 [Geist, Digital Agenda].
16. Ryan Bates, "Communication Breakdown: 'he Recording industry's Pursuit of the
Individual Music User, a Comparison of US and EU Copyright Protections for Internet
Music File Sharing" (2005) 25 NwJ Int'l L & Bus 229.
17. In Canada, for example, copyright reform has been repeatedly on the legislative agenda. In
addition, we have seen an amendment to the Criminal Code to prohibit the videotaping
of movies in cinemas: Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 432. In the United States,
the Digital Millennium CopyrightAct, Pub L No 105-304, 112 Star 2860 (1998), and the
Copyright Term Extension Act, supra note 14, are two high profile examples.
18. For example, the recently negotiated Anti- Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, which has yet to
be enacted into law, will require significant amendments to enhance the enforcement of
intellectual property rights. See Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, open for signature, 1
October 2011, online: Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada
<http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-com merciaux/fo/intellect_
property.aspx?view=d>. The proposed Canada-European Union Comprehensive and
Economic Trade Agreement, which is currently under negotiation, also addresses a number
of intellectual property issues: Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, "Canada-
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lawyers and legal academics have engaged so thoroughly in the often acrimonious
debates over the shape that intellectual property laws should take.' 9
There is another phenomenon that is a product of this upsurge in attention
to intellectual property law and policy, and it is one that highlights the signifi-
cance of what is at stake in these debates. In recent years there has been a rise in
thinking and writing about intellectual property not by legal academics or lawyers
but by authors trained in other disciplines.2" Such authors observe and reflect
upon the impact of intellectual property law and policy upon society and upon
culture more broadly. Far from being an arcane and technical area of the law best
left to legal specialists, intellectual property law has become a source of debate
over what it means to think, to create, and to participate in culture and society.
Many of these authors engage with issues of legal reform by highlighting how the
current laws or policies negatively impact the production or communication of
knowledge or culture within their respective disciplines." Others move beyond spe-
cific flaws in legislation or policy and engage with broader underlying questions.2
European Union: Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) Negotiations,"
online: <http://www.international.gc.caltrade-agreements-accords-commerciauxlagr-acc/
eu-ue/can-eu.aspx>.
19. The volume of academic writing on issues of intellectual property law reform is too vast to
cite here. In Canada, two edited volumes directed specifically at Canadian copyright law
reform offer a good cross-section of articles on all aspects of this process. See Geist, Public
Interest, supra note 15 and Geist, DigitalAgenda, supra note 15. In the United States, a group
of legal academics specializing in copyright law filed an amicus curiae brief in support of
a challenge to the constitutionality of the Copyright Term Extension Act, supra note 14. See
Brieffor Copyright Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Eldred v Ashcrof,
537 US 186 (2003). The brief can be found online: <http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/
eldredvashcroft/cert/copyprof-amicus.html>.
20. There are so many that this is only a sampling of books by those outside the discipline of law:
Salah Basalamah, Le droit de traduire: unepolitique culturelle pour la mondialisation (Ottawa:
Les Presses de l'Universit6 d'Ottawa, 2009); Susan M Bielstein, Permissions, a Survival Guide:
Blunt Talk About Art as Intellectual Property (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006);
Ben Kiemens, Math You Can't Use: Patents, Copyright, and Software (Washington: Brookings
Institution Press, 2006); Kembrew McLeod, Freedom of Expression: Overzealous Copyright
Bozos and Other Enemies of Creativity (Toronto: Doubleday, 2005); Marilyn Randall,
Pragmatic Plagiarism: Authorship, Profit, and Power (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
2001); Jessica Reyman, The Rhetoric of Intellectual Property: Copyright Law and the Regulation
of Digital Culture (New York: Routledge, 2010); Siva Vaidhyanathan, The Anarchist in the
Library: How the Clash Between Freedom and Control is Hacking the Real World and Crashing
the System (New York: Basic Books, 2004).
21. See e.g. Bielstein, ibid; Klemens, ibid.
22. See e.g. McLeod, supra note 20; Reyman, supra note 20; Vaidhyanathan, supra note 20;
Randall, supra note 20; Basalamah, supra note 20.
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It is within this movement that In Praise of Copying and Common as Air
leave their mark. Both books offer original critical perspectives on contempo-
rary intellectual property law and culture. They engage in a crucially important
debate-that of the constitutive effect of property law (intellectual or other-
wise) on society and the need, in a global community where intellectual property
is taking on greater and greater importance, to talk about how this area of law
shapes our society and whether it is doing so in a way that achieves the common
good. Both of these books underline the point that discourse about intellectual
property law is increasingly discourse about culture and society.
This broader engagement with intellectual property issues can itself be traced
to the phenomena of globalization and digitization. Globalization has opened the
discourse to new voices and compelling fresh perspectives. It has shifted the locus
of the development of norms to international fora and has caused a lively resis-
tance to the forces of global capitalism that so dominated the TRIPS agreement.
Digitization has challenged traditional means of control over the publication and
dissemination of works; it has changed how works are created and by whom,
and it has gone a great distance towards empowering both those who consume
and those who create works in the new media. Globalization has put intellectual
property laws at the centre of debates about human health and international
equity;2 3 globalization and digitization have also facilitated the creation of net-
works of scholars and activists who challenge established institutions and shape
new forms of discourse around the commodification of human knowledge.2 This
is the context in which both Common as Air and In Praise of Copying offer their
insights and prescriptions for change.
Each book is quite different from the other. Common asAir engages directly
with the foundational principles of intellectual property protection and argues
for a rethinking of law and policy in light of these principles. In Praise of Copying,
written from a Buddhist perspective, challenges our understanding of the con-
cept of copying and places it at the centre of human culture and creativity. Yet
the two books have commonalities as well. Both share membership in the grow-
23. See e.g. Carolos M Correa, Intellectual Property Rights, the WTO, and Developing Countries:
The TRIPSAgreement and Policy Options (London, UK: Zed Books, 2000); Chidi
Oguamanam, International Law and Indigenous Knowledge: Intellectual Property Rights, Plant
Biodiversity and Traditional Medicine (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006); Amir H
Khoury, "The 'Public Health' of the Conventional International Patent Regime & The Ethics
of'Ethicals': Access to Patented Medicines" (2008) 25 Cardozo Arts & Ent LJ 26.
24. See e.g. McLeod, supra note 20; Vaidhyanathan, supra note 20; Susan Scafadi, Who Owns
Culture?: Appropriation and Authenticity in American Law (New Brunswick: Rutgers
University Press, 2005).
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ing movement of alternate perspectives on intellectual property law. Both tackle
issues at the heart of intellectual property debates and both challenge the reader
to rethink, in a very fundamental way, how they conceive of this system of laws
that gives monopoly rights over ostensibly original works of human intellect.
Both address intellectual property law generally, although both also focus their
discussion and examples primarily on copyright law.25
Lewis Hyde-an English professor at Kenyon College, a faculty associate at
Harvard's Berkman Center for 'Internet and Society, and author of Common as
Air-describes himself as "a poet, essayist, translator, and cultural critic with a
particular interest in the public life of the imagination."26 Common as Air is not
his first book about culture and intellectual property law,27 although it is the first,
perhaps, to focus directly on an exploration of the cultural commons and "how
we treat art and ideas once they have entered the public sphere." 8 Hyde identifies
three key historical events that have led to a crisis of the cultural commons: the
rise of the knowledge economy, the advent of digital copying and the Internet,
and a dramatic increase in data speed and internet bandwidth. Hyde believes that
we have lost our way. He sees a disjuncture between intellectual property law and
the culture of creativity and innovation, the two being wedged apart by corporate
capitalism and its excessive commodification of culture.
Hyde's solution is to return us to eighteenth-century America-more specifi-
cally, to the idealism and insights of the founding fathers. The founding fathers
operated at a moment in US history when it was necessary to choose the norms
and principles of citizenship and governance. It was also a time when liberty,
both commercial and intellectual, had been hard fought and hard won. Hyde
chooses this moment to explore the principles upon which America was founded
and to compare the vision of the founding fathers-grounded upon small-r re-
publican values-to a contemporary society of expanding intellectual property
rights and increasingly aggressive claims to property in works of the mind. As he
25. Hyde engages a bit more with patents and in small ways with trademarks, while Boon
incorporates a more extensive discussion of trademarks and very few references to patent
law. This is perhaps symptomatic of broader difficulties that arise in contemporary discourse
about intellectual property. While there is now a large box labeled intellectual property into
which we can toss copyright, patents, trademarks, industrial design, semiconductor chip
protection, plant variety protection, and other emerging rights, it is increasingly difficult to
generalize effectively across these regimes and systems.
26. Lewis Hyde, online: <http://wwv.lewishyde.com>.
27. See e.g. Lewis Hyde, The Gif. Creativity and the Artist in the Modern World, 25th Anniversary
Edition (New York: Vintage Books, 2007); Lewis Hyde, Trickster Makes This World: Mischief
Myth, andArt (New York: North Point, 1999).
28. Supra note 1 at 18.
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explains it, "[T]his book engages in the simple mischief of comparing current
claims about cultural ownership to claims made in the eighteenth century."29 This
is an interesting project, though it is obviously not one that is global or compara-
tive in scope."s
The title of the book, Common as Air, makes reference to the concept of a
commons. Hyde is not the first to consider the eighteenth-century enclosure of
the commons in Britain as a metaphor for the ever-expanding scope of contem-
porary intellectual property law.31 Indeed, for Hyde it is more than a metaphor.
He considers the first enclosure to have been the capture of the agricultural com-
mons in England; the second, occurring around us, is the capture of the cultural
commons. Yet Hyde is careful with his definition of the commons, emphasizing
the inherent normative values of such a concept. For him, the commons is not
just a space that is free to all; rather, it is a shared space that has its own social
norms, customs, and conventions.32 In his words, "A true commons is a stinted
thing."3 3 It is "a social regime for managing a collectively owned resource. ' '34
For Hyde, the crux of the matter is values. He argues for a value-based
approach to intellectual property law that is sensitive to a much broader and
more inclusive set of stakeholders. Thus, it is not enough to characterize intel-
lectual property law as dealing with the rights of creators, with a corresponding
emphasis placed on their needs and interests. This would be what he character-
izes as the commercial version of the utilitarian theory of copyright law. Under
the commercial version it is the market that determines the good to be achieved.
By contrast, a very different version of utilitarianism, the civic version, seeks to
articulate the social and public objectives of the law and then shapes the law to
29. Ibidat 19.
30. Boon is global in his analysis and his discussion. He writes about cultural production in a
way that extends beyond any one culture. Boon situates his discussion of cultural attitudes
towards copying within this global and globalized context and offers a very original and
interesting critical approach. Hyde, by focusing on the US founding fathers in the eighteenth
century, is more culturally specific.
31. See e.g. James Boyle, The Public Domain: Enclosing the Commons of the Mind (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 2008). The international movement to more freely share copyright
protected works also makes reference to the concept of the commons in its use of the name
Creative Commons. See "A Culture of Sharing," online: <http://creativecommons.org/
videos/a-shared-culture>.
32. Hyde offers a critique of Garrett Hardin's famous essay, "The Tragedy of the Commons,"
arguing that it was premised on a level of freedom that simply never existed with the
traditional English commons. See supra note I at 31, critiquing Garrett Hardin, "The
Tragedy of the Commons" (1968) 162 Science 1243.
33. Hyde, Common as Air, ibid at 35.
34. Ibid at 43.
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meet those ends. Hyde argues for an approach to intellectual property rights that
is properly inclusive and public-minded.
Hyde is critical of the ever-expanding scope of intellectual property rights.
He argues that the story of intellectual property protection is one of lost limits,
observing that "it seems to be in the nature of all property rights that they expand all
the time." 3 He notes how copyright law in the United States has steadily expand-
ed the kinds of works protected and the duration of protection. The elimination
of the registration requirement also expanded the number of works subject to
copyright law. In the patent context, he considers the eroding boundaries be-
tween ideas and inventions, particularly with respect to emerging technologies,
as well as the degrading of the utility requirement in the field of biotechnology. 6
He laments that the point of departure for intellectual property law has become
the "assumption of exclusive ownership," as opposed to an assumption of a
shared commons. 37
Hyde argues that since the underlying intellectual property in works is
intangible and difficult to control, industries have been built around creat-
ing and selling the containers for works (for example, books, CDs, or DVDs),
particularly in the copyright context. He-describes these containers as making
the works "sticky '38 and notes how digitization and the Internet has radically
subverted those industries by separating the works from their containers. The
industry response has been to use technical protection measures and end-user
licence agreements to render digital works "sticky."39 But in doing so they have
gone further than what copyright law envisioned, eliminating fair use or prohib-
iting what were once common and accepted uses of works such as reading out
loud or sharing.
Hyde's critique of these changes both to copyright law and to industry prac-
tice is "that we are redesigning this ship as we sail it, and no one can yet say how
it should be fitted to serve all the ends we care about, nor what it might look
like fifty years from now."4 His solution is not to challenge or critique particular
legislative choices but instead to engage with and explore the underlying values
that should guide those choices. Hyde finds these values in the writings of the
founding fathers of the United States. He notes that when these men addressed
35. Ibidat 56.
36. Ibidat 60-61.
37. Ibid at 58.
38. Ibid at 63.
39. Ibid at 67.
40. Ibid at 65.
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themselves to intellectual property law, "it was always approached with skepti-
cism under the assumption that exclusive control of ideas was at odds with many
of the larger purposes toward which the new nation might be dedicated."4 1
Hyde is careful to distinguish between property rights and monopoly rights,
and he argues that intellectual property rights fall into the latter category. He
describes a monopoly right as a privilege rather than a natural right. 'The mo-
nopoly is permitted to serve a purpose; in the case of intellectual property, it is to
encourage ingenuity and creativity. From the founding fathers, he draws on the
view that monopolies should never be perpetual; they exist for the period of time
necessary to achieve the desired public policy goals. According to Hyde, perpetual
monopolies are despotic, anti-democratic, and silencing. They cannot serve the
public good. In his view, it is important to keep the monopoly rights typical of
intellectual property distinct from other property rights because of the need, in the
case of intellectual property, "[t] o speak of privileges and the public good."4 2 This
in turn forces a public debate on what the good is that is meant to be served and
how best to achieve it. Again drawing on the writings of the founding fathers, he
argues that the goal of monopoly privileges was to "serve the ends of political and
religious liberty."4 3 This broad goal encompasses the dissemination of knowledge.
Hyde also argues that the small-r republicanism of the founding fathers val-
ued civic virtue, which was defined as "the willing subordination of self-interest
to the public good."44 In the intellectual property context, this would mean a
broad acceptance that intellectual property monopolies must be limited so as
to preserve a balancing of private interests with the broader public good. Hyde
writes: "In a democracy, therefore, intellectual property is ultimately a republican
estate. It is the intangible equivalent of the tangible res publicae (roads, bridg-
es, harbours) or of the Republic itself."45 Hyde offers the example of Benjamin
Franklin, who embraced the public good by refusing to patent his inventions and
by publishing his ideas widely. While he does not advocate an abdication of intel-
lectual property rights by authors and creators (and indeed, he claims copyright
in his own book), Hyde nevertheless champions this idea of civic virtue-that is,
championing the virtue of authors who, once rewarded for their contributions to
society, dedicate their work to the public domain. Hyde argues that the progress
of science requires a liberty to communicate, and therefore there must always be
41. Ibid at 77.
42. Ibid at 215.
43. Ibid at 106.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid at 106-07.
342 (2011)49 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
limits on monopoly privileges.
For Hyde, the increasing enclosure of the intellectual and creative commons
offers serious challenges to democracy and community. He reflects on the dif-
ficulties of being a citizen "in a mass culture dominated by corporate 'content
providers."'4" He notes that the language of mass media and consumer culture is
increasingly also propertized-through the vehicle of trademark law-contrib-
uting to an undermining of democracy. Between trademark and copyright law
he laments an increasingly restricted sphere of discourse. Hyde argues that "our
practices in regard to ownership enable or disable particular identities."4' 7 His pas-
sionate engagement is evident when he writes that
those who have been the agents of the second enclosure seem such bad actors to
those of us who would resist it; the higglers, hucksters, engrossers, forestallers,
regraters, retailers and speculators who brought us copyright term extension and all
its ancillary legal strategies have brought severalty to the public domain.4
Hyde draws an analogy between democratic civic engagement and engage-
ment in the creation, consumption, and expression of culture. He writes, "If you
want a viable democracy, you cannot sell your vote. If you want a lively cultural
commons, you can't allow corporate media to enclose the public domain."4 9 The
structures of ownership limit and suppress creativity and engagement while act-
ing to the detriment of the common good.
Hyde adds his voice to the many others that have argued that innovation
and monopolies are not inseparably intertwined. Indeed, he notes that creativity
itself depends upon the ability to borrow (and in this he would find common
ground with the work of Marcus Boon). By way of example, he points to a variety
of artists and scientists who, in their own work, borrowed either from the com-
mon stock of knowledge or culture or from others. For example, he notes how
Bob Dylan drew heavily from folk music for his own work and suggests that his
ability to do so-and his resultant success-owed much to the fact that he was
creating his music prior to the onset of the second enclosure (the enclosure of
the intellectual commons)."' Hyde argues that the commodification of the legacy
of Martin Luther King Jr., with his son using copyright and trademark law to
exploit his works and image, "convert[s] a public voice into a chattel."'" Indeed,
46. Ibid at 108.
47. Ibid at 186.
48. Ibid at 176.
49. Ibid at 168.
50. Ibidat 45.
51. Ibidat 213.
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Hyde uses this example as one that "re-enact[s] in miniature the history by which
the founders' civic republicanism slowly mutated into its current commercial
form."52 Hyde argues that "our practices around cultural property allow us to be
certain kinds of selves; with them we enable or disable ways of being human."5 3
Hyde laments that "the public domain has turned out to be highly vulner-
able to private capture." 4 His solution is not so much an undoing of copyright
as a rethinking of its goals and aspirations. He rejects the pairing of "copy-left"
as the opposite of "copy-right," arguing that when used in this sense, copy-left
implies that both concepts occupy a place along a political spectrum."5 In his
view, the more appropriate juxtaposition is between copyright and "copy-duty. 56
This flows from his argument that the monopoly right serves a broader public
purpose and that those who are granted limited monopolies are committed to
recognize and serve the public duties that underlie them. Just as the commons
was a shared space governed by norms that operated for the common good, Hyde
would reconstitute copyright as a means of managing the commons in the public
interest rather than as a means of appropriating it for the sake of private interests.
Hyde's choice of the founding fathers as the departure point for his inquiry
into the principles of copyright is particularly apposite when he links a vibrant
public discourse to the goals of a vigorous democracy. He criticizes what he sees
as an increasingly deceptive corporate and political discourse in which truth is
hidden rather than disclosed to the public. Hyde writes, "In a democracy that
honors listening, leaders do not so much decide policy as enable conversation,
helping the public remain audible and visible to itself. A leader's obligations are
to transparency and to keeping the noise low enough so that no speaker gets
drowned out."5 7 Where private ownership is favoured over public discourse, the
goals of democracy are subverted. Hyde observes that "[i] f democratic practice
(not to mention creativity) depends on plural speech and plural listening, then
we should rightly be reluctant to give any modern form of Negative Voice a pres-
ence in the public sphere."58
Hyde's linking of contemporary politics and democracy to debates over
intellectual property rights is particularly important, as these debates take place
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibidat 216.
55. Ibidat 220.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibidat 231.
58. Ibidat 235.
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within a broader information context. He offers several pages of examples of ways
in which copyright law can be used to limit or suppress unpopular speech-or
at least speech that is unpopular to copyright holders. 9 At issue, and increas-
ingly intertwined with intellectual property laws, are questions about who is
entitled to speak, what they can say, and who can participate in the formulation
of speech and ideas. By situating his discussion of intellectual property norms
in the context of the American Revolution, Hyde also reminds his readers of
Thomas Jefferson's view that revolution is sometimes necessary to regain freedom
in the face of oppression and repression. He notes that the founding fathers "were
always concerned with questions of power and subordination."6
While Hyde's book approaches the subject of intellectual property law from
the perspective of one who is outside the discipline of law, it is still a book about
intellectual property law-or, at the very least, about intellectual property theory.
Although he does not advocate for specific legislative reforms, it is clear that
Hyde seeks solutions to contemporary challenges through a rethinking of the
fundamental objectives and the philosophical underpinnings of the intellectual
property system.
Marcus Boons goal in his book In Praise of Copying is markedly differ-
ent. While he does engage with the system of intellectual property law,
his work takes us outside of the specific legislative framework to partici-
pate in a broader discourse about culture and creation. Indeed, Boon regards
this view from outside as essential to contemplating the bigger issues; he
is gently critical of Lawrence Lessig and James Boyle, both iconic critics of
the copyright system, for failing to see outside of the legal paradigm.61
Boon, a professor of English at York University, is also a Buddhist, and his
book is explicitly influenced by the tenets of this faith. Boon's objective is to
explore the concept of copying, an activity at the heart of the exclusive rights of
intellectual property holders. Indeed, intellectual property law is largely about
the right to make copies-or to claim the legitimacy or authenticity of autho-
rized copies or works, marks, or inventions. Boon draws on history, philosophy,
arts, and culture in a wide-ranging exploration of what it means to copy and what
role copying plays in culture, identity, and human society. Boon explores cultural
59. Ibidat 235-39.
60. Ibid at 234.
61. Boon argues that both Lessig and Boyle offer critiques that "accept the capitalist system as it
currently stands, and propose modifications of IP law that basically support the expansion of
that system and its need to exploit creative labor, entrepreneurship of ideas, and so on." Supra
note 2 at 239.
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creation writ large, from visual arts to written work, music, drama, film, folk art,
and artisanship. In this essay on copying, intellectual property law and the rights
it confers recur as a theme, but it is by no means the core of the work, nor is it the
lens through which the subject is approached. Intellectual property law is a reflec-
tion of certain attitudes towards copying that have been concretized as norms.
Boon's interest in copying transcends these particular norms, even while it teases
out the attitudes, fears, and desires that have shaped them.
Boons first chapter launches the reader into the dilemma of copies and copy-
ing. Its centrepiece is an account of the struggles of the producers of luxury goods
to protect and enforce their intellectual property rights. He moves us seamlessly
between the Counterfeit Alley in New York and the Chinese sweatshops in which
both authentic and counterfeit wares are manufactured. In the case of Louis Vuit-
ton, he explores how the family owned business morphed into a multinational
conglomerate by shifting to a model of mass-produced "unique" items. 2 He notes
how the company allied itself with an appropriation artist, a pairing which led to an
exhibit that challenged the distinction between original and copy. Boon goes on to
use the burgeoning trade in high quality replicas of luxury goods as a platform for
exploring the distinction between the original and the copy. Not only are replicas
often indistinguishable from the originals, but they are sometimes more desirable.
He writes, "When original and copy are produced together in the same factory,
at different moments; when a copy is actually self-consciously preferred to the
original, we must ask again: What do we mean when we say 'copy'?"63
Although it has become almost trite to say that creativity requires copying,
Boon nevertheless offers an engaging and interesting account of cultural and
subcultural innovation that is premised upon copying. Pursuing the concept of
copy throughout history, Boon posits that "the concept of the original or authen-
tic text, as something separate from the copies made from this original ... only
emerged in the eighteenth century with the evolution of Romantic aesthetics."6
He takes us from this to Beat and Pop artists who maintained "that the copy
was more original than the original, precisely because it made explicit its
own dependence on other things, signs, or matters."6 Onwards to the mix tape
and the mix CD, Boon again explores the self that is present in the act of creat-
ing these derivative works. Like Hyde, he also explores the role of copying in
folk, blues, and rap music, as well as in other subcultures. Boon cautions that
62. lbidat38-39.
63. Ibid at 18.
64. Ibid at 48-49.
65. Ibidat49.
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contemporary intellectual property regimes are hostile to this form of copying
as abundance, and he asks, "[I]s it not the case that any attempt today to 'con-
stellate' a people ... will find itself blocked by intellectual property regimes that
refuse such nascent collectives the right to present -and articulate themselves out-
side existing property regimes?"66
Boon explores copying in a wide variety of contexts, from human reproduc-
tion to art and to the expression of self and identity. He considers copying as
a kind of transformation. Through repetition, differences emerge, and through
these differences, things and selves are transformed. He also traces, through
human history, resistance to transformations through rituals and taboos that
sought to limit activities that might otherwise transform communities or
cultures. He speculates that these taboos may be rooted in fear of change and
a desire for greater permanence. Boon raises the question of whether we have
fashioned, in contemporary times, a taboo around copying. Noting that taboo is
a strong word, he nevertheless finds that it
illuminates the irrational aspect of those prohibitions on copying today, and the
strange violence that accompanies the enforcement of intellectual-property law: the
raids on American working-class and immigrant neighbourhoods where counter-
feits are sold, the involvement of mafias and gangsters, the sporadic global "war
on copying" undertaken by the United States and other governments, with their
discourses of moral hygiene (the protection of "economic health"). 6 7
Indeed, Boon observes that the proponents of strong intellectual property
laws have linked copying to terrorism and organized crime, underlining the power
of the taboo. In an era of widely diffused and accessible technologies for reproduc-
tion, the taboo "protects and naturalizes capitalist production modes, in particular
the myth of the naturalness of the commodity and of private property."68
For Boon, the right to copy is a political issue; it is about the freedom of
people to express, shape, and articulate identities-a process he describes as mi-
mesis. 9 Indeed, he traces the reach of intellectual property laws into the human
genome itself and writes about the creeping control over and propertization of
reproduction (nature's copying) through intellectual property law. Ultimately,
intellectual property laws "manipulate our fears of the remarkable plasticity of
mimesis; they set standards for what is called 'original' and what a 'copy', what is
'real' and what is 'fake', who belongs and who is an imposter, what is fixed and
66. lbidat 75-76.
67. Ibid at 97.
68. Ibidat 102.
69. Ibidat 105.
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what is allowed to change, what is called 'natural' or 'unnatural'." 70
Boon's remarkable and engaging exploration of copying includes an account
of copying as deception. While copying (in particular counterfeiting) is consid-
ered wrong, at least in part because of the deception practiced on the public, Boon
challenges us to think about who the audience is for certain works and where the
deception lies. He notes that "[t]he argument that copying is wrong because it is
deceptive rests on the belief that it is always possible to name and describe things
correctly, to say what an original is, and for things to present themselves correctly
via their outward appearance."'" Yet, he maintains that it is possible to argue that
all production is deceptive in some form or another. Further, he notes that in
those cases where forgeries become virtually indistinguishable from the originals
the distinction between copy and original erodes. In the case of digital copying,
the distinctions between copy and original may lie in packaging and presentation
and not in the contents themselves.72 Boon states that "[t] he pathos of deception,
and the supposed need to protect the public from its harmful effects, are used
to enable corporations and wealthy individuals to -legally enforce their right to
extract maximum profits from a given situation. ' ' 3
A real pleasure in Boons work is the manner in which he explores, from a
wide variety of angles, those concepts that are at the heart of discourse around
intellectual property law. His examination of deception is but one example: It
moves from bootlegged Harry Potter books in Asia, to the use of camouflage in
nature and in war, to forged art, concepts of authenticity, and the representation
of deception and illusion in philosophy, art, and film. His explorations of notions
of authenticity, forgery, deception, and camouflage in their broader social and
cultural contexts are engaging and thought provoking; he grounds these explora-
tions in concrete examples that return us to the dilemmas of intellectual property.
For example, he uses Turnitin.com, the online tool for detecting plagiarized stu-
dent papers, as a vehicle to discuss copying as deception and to explore both the
moral significance and the distinctions between authentic works and copies.
7
14
Boon observes that a lazy copy is on a par with a lazy original work in terms of
its contribution to any broader social good. Yet, he argues "good deception, and
the copy that it fabricates, can possess profound insight, not only into situational
requirements, such as what the teacher is looking for, but also into the object
70. Ibid.
71. Ibidat lll.
72. This is a reference back to Hyde's "sticky" works. Supra note 1 at 63, 66-67.
73. Supra note 2 at 115.
74. Ibid at 137-38.
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being copied.""5 This will be heresy to some, but it is an interesting perspective
on, to borrow a term from Canadian copyright law, the "exercise of skill and
judgement" 6 that is the hallmark of originality in copyright law.
Boon also addresses montage as a form of expression. Certainly, he is not
the first to problematize contemporary forms of creation that cut and paste from
other works to produce works that sit uneasily on the border between original
and copy." Yet his approach is different, in large part because he is not making an
argument about how the law should treat montage; rather, he is simply explor-
ing how we understand and process concepts of authenticity and copying. His
argument here is that there is often something profoundly creative in the act of
copying and that there rriay be a strong subversive element as well. He situates
montage-in a sense that goes beyond specific works and speaks more to a way of
making connections between things-as a form of intellectual freedom deserving
of nurture rather than suppression.
Boon also gives special attention to the mass production of copies. He notes
that "[c]opying is an act of repetition, and contains in it the possibility of repeat-
ing that repetition unto infinity."78 A trace of this sense of the infinite is found on
shelf after shelf of mass-produced items. Yet Boon looks beyond the mass produc-
tion of commodities. He considers the replication of towns in which one can find
the same features and stores; of businesses that adopt similar business models;
of nations themselves; and of the social rituals that dictate how we dress and act
in various contexts. He writes, "Mass production reminds us of that teeming
biological mass that we come from and live in; and it contains an echo of that
greater similarity which we are part of, and the limits to our own separateness and
individuality." 9 In this reorientation towards mass production Boon notes that
the individuality of items is lost; that copies come closer to the ideal of the object;
and that "[clapitalist commodities present themselves as 'perfect copies,' meaning
75. Ibidat 141.
76. CCH Canadian Ltd v Law Society of Upper Canada, [2004] 1 SCR 339 at para 16. The
Supreme Court of Canada determined that the standard of originality for copyright law in
Canada required that a work not be copied and that it be the result of an exercise of skill and
judgement.
77. A very few examples include: Lisa Veasman, "'Piggy Backing' on the Web 2.0 Internet:
Copyright Liability and Web 2.0 Mashups" (2007-2008) 30 Hastings Comm & Ent LJ 311;
Graham Reynolds, "A Stroke of Genius or Copyright Infringement?: Mashups and Copyright
in Canada," (2009) 6 Scripted 641, online: <http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/SCRIPT-ed/vol6-
3/reynolds.pdf>; Yochai Benkler, The Wealth ofNetworks: How Social Production Transforms
Markets and Freedom (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006) ch 3.
78. Supra note 2 at 177.
79. Ibidat 183.
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the embodiment of the ideal form in an object protected from history and the
world."8 Branding-and by extension trademark law-plays a role here as well:
Boon argues that the brand reinforces the belief in the essence of the object and
allows "identities to emerge out of a mass of copies."8 1
Boon also explores the idea of copying as appropriation. He notes that all
copying "is an appropriation because it takes the outward appearance of one
thing and brings it forth in another."82 Beyond this, copying "involves positing
a relationship between two objects, the name of one being given to another, the
form of one being produced or recognized in the other."83 In contrast to these
forms of appropriation Boon presents the concept of depropriation, which aban-
dons claims of ownership and, with this, notions of copying.8" Yet Boon does
not argue for a complete abandonment of notions of ownership and intellectual
property. He argues that "[r]espect, care for the particularities of transmission
and dissemination is important; and in this sense, some version of copyright law
is 'appropriate."'8 " By the same token, movements to expand the public domain
are also appropriate. Boon would appear to seek a more organic balance between
appropriation and depropriation, recognizing in each something that is essential
to culture and the articulation of identities.
For Boon, a free culture is not to be found within the strictures of our capi-
talist system, nor is it necessarily enabled by our intellectual property laws. He is
critical of the ideology of the intellectual property system, which he claims relies
upon "a discourse of meeting needs, providing solutions, allowing access, getting
jobs done, and of course compensating all interested parties fairly."8 6 He cautions
against the limits of this discourse when contemplating the role of mimesis in
our cultures and societies. Intellectual property laws would contain and control
copying and would limit it to particular circumstances and contexts. Yet, as Boon
argues throughout his work, copying or mimesis is a fundamental part of who
and what we are and of how we define and constitute ourselves. He argues that
there is much to learn from Buddhism and from Indigenous cultures, which
"articulate a vision of a universe and collectivity that actively engages and works
with mimesis while abandoning all notions of property at their illusory roots."87
80. Ibid at 185.
81. Ibidat 188.
82. Ibidat 221.
83. Ibid at 225.
84. Ibid at 223.
85. Ibidat 235.
86. [bid at 241.
87. Ibid at 244.
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In this respect, Boon, in contrast to Hyde, looks outside Western culture and
values for alternative accounts and perspectives.
Both Hyde and Boon offer thought-provoking explorations of intellectual
property from outside the legal paradigm. Neither book is really about what
particular provisions of intellectual property law should be, nor how existing
laws should be interpreted. Rather, the books are about what the law should seek
to achieve as an instrument of cultural policy (or perhaps, what the law should
simply leave alone). Both works are informed by their authors' formation as literary
and cultural scholars and by their deep personal engagement in culture and creativity.
Notwithstanding the contributions of each author to a rich and textured
discussion of culture and intellectual property, I feel compelled to note that each
of these books offers an account in which women seem marginalized, both as
thinkers and as creators. Perhaps because Hyde chooses to mine the attitudes
and approaches of the founding fathers as a means of reworking contemporary
approaches to the intellectual commons, he finds few female voices to draw upon
in his work. Yet this erasure of women-somewhat explicit in the eighteenth
century, more implicit in contemporary times-is nevertheless wearing. We
hear of Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, Arthur Rimbaud, William Blake,
Ren6 Descartes, James Madison, Tom Paine, and many others. In his examples
of artists and creators in more modern times we find Bob Dylan, John Cage, TS
Eliot, the Grateful Dead, Pete Seeger, and Woody Guthrie. It is not as if female
thinkers, writers, and artists are entirely absent from the book-references are
peppered here and there. It is just that they occupy relatively little space or sig-
nificance within the work as a whole. One would be forgiven for thinking that
the human enterprises of writing, thinking, inventing, and creating were almost
entirely the province of men. Perhaps it is worth questioning whether this small-r
republicanism of the founding fathers-which was built on civic virtue enabled
by the fruits of slavery and the unpaid labour of women and which protected and
cherished the voices of some while ignoring or suppressing others-has other les-
sons for contemporary intellectual property discourse.
Boon is more expressly inclusive than Hyde. There are many more female
artists, authors, and philosophers within his account. Yet the overall impression
is once again of a universe of cultural creation that is dominated by men. It is
not just a numerical imbalance; the contributions of men are discussed in greater
detail. Thus, we hear of Bob Dylan, Marc Jacobs, Marcel Duchamps, John Cage,
Bert Jansch, Woody Allen, Gunther Von Hagens, William Burroughs, Glenn
Gould, Orson Welles-the list continues. The only female creator who receives
as much ink as any of these men is JK Rowling, but the discussion around her
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works is not about how they explore or subvert concepts of copying or authentic-
ity, but rather how they are copied and transformed by others. While Boon does
reference female artists, writers, and composers far more often than Hyde, they
are less visible than the men in his account. This may simply be a reflection of
the hard reality of women's marginalized role in culture and society, and indeed,
Boon himself raises this question. In discussing human reproduction as copying,
Boon notes that copying appears to be a stereotypically masculine activity, and
he asks whether it is "a specifically male attempt to imitate, appropriate, fix and
control the knowledge of becoming and transformation that is a part of women's
experience of their bodies, through the menstrual cycle, pregnancy, giving birth
and nurturing a child."88 Essentialism aside, it is nonetheless worth exploring the
relationship of women to the norms embedded in the mass of intellectual prop-
erty prescriptions that we have fashioned. In their own ways, Common as Air and
In Praise of Copying beg the question of whether women are truly participants in
the formulation of the norms that give shape to intellectual property laws, the
discourse about them, or any process of shaping or remaking culture.
Both Common as Air and In Praise of Copying tell us that the law reflects a series
of cultural and contingent choices that may not be good or right. Both tell us that
intellectual property law is about more than just the rules of use and ownership of
a type of property-it is about how we constitute societies, how we share ideas and
wealth, how we create, and how we define ourselves. Both texts implicitly make the
argument that the discourse about intellectual property law is no longer the terrain
of lawyers; it is fundamentally about culture, democracy, and society.
This change in who is participating in intellectual property discourse is im-
portant. It marks a shift in attention to intellectual property issues and a broadening
of public and intellectual engagement with fundamental questions about the
ownership of the fruits of culture and innovation. While Hyde sees the choices
we make in copyright law and policy to be about how we constitute society-and
ultimately democracy-Boon's approach is less policy oriented. By challenging
or questioning the very idea of the copy, and of concepts such as authenticity, he
challenges us to rethink our relationships to things, to the objects we create or
alter, and to culture more broadly.
Both authors invite a broad audience to engage with fundamentally impor-
tant questions that are central to contemporary culture and society. This is a
message that was sent to legislators in Canada's latest round of copyright reform,
and it is a message that stirred the ire and resistance of established cultural industries.
88. Ibid at 84-85.
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It is also a message that was heard in the context of the Doha Development
Round of negotiations under the auspices of the World Trade Organization and
that is increasingly rippling through international fora. The last two decades of
expanding intellectual property protection and increasingly strident enforcement
has brought new voices and new perspectives into a debate about laws that now
reach so far as to be seen by many as a threat to the culture and innovation they
ostensibly seek to foster. Both Hyde and Boon add their voices to this increasingly
diverse chorus for change, and both make distinct and worthy contributions.
